Inducing visibility and visual deduction by Morgan, Mary S.
Inducing visibility and visual deduction
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103540/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Morgan, Mary S. (2020) Inducing visibility and visual deduction. Economic History
Working Papers (306). London School of Economics and Political Science, London,
UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
  
 
 
Economic History Working Papers 
 
 
No: 306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science,  
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, London, UK. T: +44 (0) 20 7955 7084.  
 
 
Inducing Visibility and  
Visual Deduction 
 
Mary S. Morgan, LSE 
 
 
February, 2020 
1 
 
Inducing Visibility and Visual Deduction∗ 
Mary S. Morgan 
 
Keywords: diagrammatic reasoning; visual inference; visual deduction; graphical 
methods 
 
 
Abstract     
Scientists use diagrams not just to visualize objects and relations in their 
fields, both empirical and theoretical, but to reason with them as tools of 
their science.  While the two dimensional space of diagrams might seem 
restrictive, scientific diagrams can depict many more than two elements, 
can be used to visualise the same materials in myriad different ways, and 
can be constructed in a considerable variety of forms.  This paper takes 
up two generic puzzles about 2D visualizations.  First: How do scientists 
in different communities use 2D spaces to depict materials which are not 
fundamentally spatial?  This prompts the distinction between diagrams 
that operate in different kinds of spaces: ‘real’, ‘ideal’, and ‘artificial’.  
And second: How do diagrams, in these different usages of 2D space, 
support various kinds of visual reasoning that cross over between 
inductive and deductive?  The argument links the representational form 
and content of a diagram (its vocabulary and grammar) with the kinds of 
inferential and manipulative reasoning that are afforded, and 
constrained, by scientists’ different usages of 2D space.   
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Studies of how diagrams are used by scientists have established that such 
representations offer a potentially wide range of epistemological services that 
cross over from inductive to deductive work.  But having recognised that 
diagrams offer a technology of representation that supports many different 
reasoning functions, it is critical to ask exactly what do the characteristic aspects 
                                                 
∗ My thanks go to Hsiang-Ke Chao, Harro Maas, Marcel Boumans and James Nguyen for 
engaging with the detail of my arguments; to participants at: a workshop on visualization 
convened by Erna Fiorentini in Berlin in 2014; a Taiwan conference on diagrams convened by 
Hsiang-Ke Chao in 2016, and the All-London HPS Reading Group’s discussion of scientific 
diagrams in 2019 convened by Chiara Ambrosio.  I also thank Xizi Luo for research assistance 
with the figures and two anonymous referees for the paper, whose challenging invitations for me 
to clarify proved incredibly helpful. 
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of diagrams - especially their use of 2D space, as opposed to other 2D visual 
materials such as pictures or photos (or even other forms of representation such 
as in words or mathematics) - offer to the scientist?  And how do diagrammatic 
representations that inhabit 2-D space support such varied usages?   
 
For the arguments of this paper, diagrams are taken to be both scientific objects 
that depict or denote things in the scientific field and - at the same time - tools 
used in scientists’ work.1  The question to be explored concerns the importance 
of the specific form of diagrammatic representation to the modes of argument 
used with it.  In Morgan (2012), I argued that making a model gives form to 
ideas in a particular medium of expression and in doing so makes them subject 
to a particular mode of reasoning that goes along with that medium.  For 
example, a working hydraulic model has a different form, and involves a 
different mode of reasoning, to a model of the same system in algebraic form.  
Even though not all diagrams are models (just as not all models are diagrams), I 
suggest that the same principle applies to diagrams: and since diagrams take 
lots of different forms, those forms don’t necessarily share one kind of usage or 
reasoning.  So, here, I extend my analysis of the relationship between form and 
reasoning to a discussion of diagrams, especially investigating those diagrams 
that feature in inductive and deductive modes of science.   
 
I use the labels ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ loosely here, for in the context of how 
scientists work with diagrams - I regard these both as explorative modes of 
                                                 
1 I have drawn, in the analysis of this paper, especially on the papers and introductions of two 
journal special issue investigations into diagrams.  Priest, de Toffoli and Findlen’s introduction 
(2018) offers a succinct entrance into the history of science literature, range of claims, and some 
useful exemplars.  They argue that one should think of diagrams as “closer to being things than 
representations of things”, though from the practising scientist and so the view of this paper, 
they surely are both.  Blackwell (2001), introducing another special issue in AI that offers 
particular resources for this paper, wants to treat diagrams as objects rather than as tools but - 
again here - in usage, such objects can be tools.  The work of three other scholars has also been 
important for my thinking.  Klein’s (1995) analysis of nineteenth-century terminology of 
diagramming as a ‘method’ captures both the making and using of diagrams. Boumans (2016) 
arguments about inductive judgement, and Woody’s analyses of the practices of theorizing the 
periodic law in chemistry (2014) and of reasoning with molecular orbital diagrams (2000), all 
proved liberating for approaching the mixed nature of reasoning with diagrams. 
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reasoning.  Scientists use diagrams to investigate, analyse, explore, suggest or 
rule out hypotheses, and generally reason about both empirical and theoretical 
matters and materials.  These reasoning practices, and functional usages, found 
with diagrams might not be strictly described as deductive or inductive, as 
recent history and philosophy of science discussions on the use of diagrams make 
clear. This difficulty can be seen from two perspectives: either scientists’ 
reasoning practices do not always fit easily into these philosophical labels, or, 
philosophers’ labels don’t always organise scientists’ modes of practical reasoning 
so well as philosophers might hope - as Woody (2014) deftly demonstrates in her 
analysis of the scientists’ reasoning that went along with representations of the 
periodic law and periodic table.  So, when I appeal to inductive and deductive 
modes of reasoning, these need to be loosely not strictly interpreted, not because 
the scientists are loose thinkers, but because practices are rarely so cut and 
dried. The point of this paper then is to concentrate attention not just on the 
diagrams of science per se, but on how scientists do science with them.  Within 
this, I have organised my analysis to understand how diagrams serve to make 
things visible, and - separately - how visualizations work as a tool for reasoning; 
the claim here is that using diagrams involves processes of both ‘inducing 
visibility’ and of ‘visual deduction’.2      
 
Another preliminary difficulty is defining what counts as a diagram, and it is 
important to note from the start that this paper is not about visual images used 
in science in general, but about diagrams, a subset of visual images in which 
scientists construct depictions of their materials.  Even amongst accounts of 
diagrams, a variety of ideas are relevant.  James Elkins (1999) differentiates 
pictures and notation from ‘schemata’ - a generic category that includes 
diagrams - and defines this generic category by what is not included rather than 
what is.  Sybille Krämer (2016) refers to ‘scripts’ or possibly “inscriptions”, a 
                                                 
2 This paper therefore takes up the contrasting agenda (set historically for economics by Chao 
and Maas, 2017) into a broader analysis of diagrams in inductive and deductive usage. Some 
readers may consider these labels misleading, and might prefer other terms or modes of 
reasoning - such as abduction.   
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category that “includes tables, lists, diagrams, graphs, and maps” (p205).  Alan 
Blackwell (2001) treats diagrams as objects that are not pictures or words.  
Perini’s (2013) account reaches closest to my interests in fixing interest on how 
“spatial relations in the picture are interpreted and thus convey content” (p 274).  
Her notion of diagrams includes pictures, but the critical point for me is how she 
focusses attention on the ‘form-content relations’ of diagrams in the context of 
visual representations in biology.   
 
The extensive OED3 definitions of diagrams refer to “An illustrative figure 
which, without representing the exact appearance of an object, gives an outline 
or general scheme of it, so as to exhibit the shape and relations of its various 
parts.”  Another OED definition points out that diagrammatic representations 
of empirical materials are essentially symbolic in form: “a set of lines, marks, or 
tracings which represent symbolically the course of results of any action or 
processes, or the variations which characterize it”.  Useful for deductive 
reasoning, they point to a definition coming from geometry: “a figure composed of 
lines, serving to illustrate a definition or statement, or to aid in the proof of a 
proposition”. And finally, another definition captures way that diagrams are 
sometimes used to depict abstract or conceptual or imagined things: “A 
delineation used to symbolize related abstract propositions or mental processes”.   
 
All of these definitions prove relevant to the examples I discuss here.  However, 
my aim is not to be driven by the definitions, nor to what is or is not a diagram in 
the sciences, but to point to how these definitions, taken together, offer 
possibilities for understanding the forms of diagrams, and their associated 
reasoning resources.  This focus on the use of diagrams in various modes is 
designed to throw light on how different modes of reasoning with diagrams 
                                                 
3 OED online consulted 13th August, 2018: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51854 
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depend on their form of construction, modes which are typically shared within a 
community of users in their research activities.4     
 
 
2.  Inducing Visibility 
Inducing visibility is an apt phrase, due to Erna Fiorentini, to refer to the ways 
in which producing diagrams makes things visible that were not visible before.5    
These diagramming processes are often (but surely not always) associated with 
the evidential space, and the process of inducing sense out of a collection of bits 
and pieces that are not so obviously related or not previously understood to be so.  
These processes might be broken down, in abstract terms if not in practise, to 
involve two elements: cognitive and inferential.   
 
First the cognitive aspect - by which I mean the ability to see something, or to 
recognise something, in the visual display a scientist produces that had lain 
unseen, un-remarked, or unrecognised in their other representing media such as 
tables, words, photos, summarising statistics, etc.  (Of course there are images 
which are the result of specially designed revealing technologies in science - such 
as X-rays - but it would seem very odd to count these as ‘diagrams’, given the 
constructive connotations of that label found in the OED definitions and in the 
literature on diagrams in science studies more generally.)  The second aspect is 
the ability to induce, or infer, within these diagrammized materials, which relies 
not only on salient subject matter knowledge, but more especially on the mode of 
reasoning appropriate to these diagrams.  The problematic issue of inference 
beyond the diagram, back to the world, will be taken up later. 
 
  
                                                 
4 I have discussed many of the examples and some of the ideas in this paper in various ways 
before, but there is a certain advantage in rethinking known objects of study (some of which go 
back to my first book) in the light of serious questions about how diagrams work.  I hope readers 
will forgive the re-use of old examples in the service of this renewed enquiry. 
5 This useful terminology was introduce at a meeting convened by Erna Fiorentini on 
“visualization” in Berlin in April 2014. 
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2.1 On Diagrams (not Tables) and Seeing (not Reading) 
The practical line between inducing visibility and inferring is necessarily opaque, 
for even the recognition of a pattern is itself an inference of a kind.  So the 
examples offered here serve not so much to define the difference between 
inducing visibility and inferring by using diagrams, but to delineate what is 
associated with each aspect.  Thus Figure 1 captures the moment that a 
scientist figured out that a drawn line - a graphic - made visible something quite 
difficult to see in a table of numbers.  In Figure 1, we see something that is half-
diagrammatic, half tabular in form, an in-between object which reveals a non-
regular, but definitely cyclical, pattern. The scientist, Clement Juglar, was a 
physician turned statistician/demographer, and his table-graphic captures the 
rises and falls in forms of money circulating in the economy in an indicative line 
beside the numbers.  Figure 2 (a and b) provides the contrast, demonstrating 
directly how a diagram (the graph, 2b) reveals, or enables the scientist to see 
possible relations between the marriage rate and the trade of the UK that lie 
hidden in the table of numbers (2a).  In this diagram: time is envisioned to move 
horizontally to the right and the vertical axes give the scales for the two series of 
numbers; whereas in the associated table: time changes vertically downwards.6 
So, not only did the language of representation move from numbers to 
diagrammed lines, but the mode of organisation and conventions of usage 
changed as the representation moved from tables to graphic diagrams.   
 
 
                                                 
6 In our contemporary social science and public usage, a table is normally read downwards with 
time, which may account for the fact that when social scientists began to adopt graphs as a mode 
of representation for phenomena in historical time around the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century, time was often on the vertical axis.  Conventions here were only settled in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century within a history of serious discussion of such methods (see 
Maas and Morgan 2002).  The convention that historical time is visualised left to right on an 
historical graph may be associated with direction of text reading; there is some evidence that in 
societies where text is read right to left, it seems more natural to read time in that direction too 
(see Tversky, 2004).  On the other hand, other conventions reign in other fields.  Geological 
strata maps depict geological (historical) time going vertically upwards. Sheredos et al (2013) 
provide examples of biological graphs in which time is on both axes (eg vertical is time of day, 
and horizontal on successive days).  The seminal study of the history and development of time-
series graphs across the sciences is Klein, 1997 
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Figure 1 Juglar’s Table-Graph.  He depicts, in a table with a sketched graph 
beside it, the circulation of money and credit cycles in and out of the Banque of 
France over the 19th century. 
 
 
Source: Clement Juglar. 1862. Des Crises Commerciales edt de leur Terour Périodiqueen France, 
en Angleterre et aux État-Unis. 2nd Edition, 1889. p154.  Paris: Guillaumin.   
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Figure 2 Bowley’s Development of Tables to Graphs.  He converts the Table (a) 
of the marriage rate and trade into Graph (b) (his figure I) and then makes their 
relationship visible in another Graph (c) (his figure III). 
 
(a)                                  (b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Source: Arthur L. Bowley. 1907. Elements of Statistics. Table p.174; Figures I and III p.175 
London: PS King & Son.  
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Graphs emerged as a form of diagram particularly helpful for depicting data of 
phenomena that can be ordered over time, or space, by some other ordered 
property.  In the fields of the examples used here, such diagrams often relied on 
the availability of data collected by the state (thus the important root of the term 
‘statistics’), such as demographic data, financial data, trade data etc., all data 
that were thought to be significant for the state, and which, during the 
nineteenth century, became public information rather than secret (see Nikolow 
2001). While the contrast in these two figures epitomise differences between 
tables and graphs and so the nature of diagrammatic representation more 
generally, there were - as always - significant precursors as shown in Figure 3 
(a and b).7 They are well worth mentioning here because they point to 
something more general about the use of 2D space: and to what is, and to what is 
not, involved in inducing visibility by creating and using diagrams.    
 
Joseph Priestley, notable chemist and man of letters of the mid-late eighteenth 
century is often credited with inventing ‘the graph’ in his immensely ambitious 
2-D display, along a horizontal historical time line (or axis), of the names of 
notable philosophers, statesman, religious men, mathematicians etc.  While 
such a graphic of history (only a small section of which is shown in Figure 3a) 
reveals which individuals overlapped in time, there is no meaningful order on 
the vertical axis, merely categories of fame which lie stacked on top of each 
other.  This may have served as a revealing representation in showing who lined 
up with whom at some historical time period, but its reasoning and inferential 
possibilities are limited because there is no vertically expressed order or scaling 
that would relate the categories.  In other words, it does not make full use of the 
second dimension of the representational space.   
 
  
                                                 
7 The most famous graphic of this fruitful late nineteenth-century period is Charles Minard’s 
1869 diagram of Napoleon’s ill-fated Moscow campaign. This turns the known facts of the 
campaign into a visual representation, of which, more later. 
10 
 
Figure 3 - Organising Visually, Using 2D Space 
 
a) Small fragment of Priestley’s massive biography chart showing: two vertical 
sections of ‘statesmen’ and ‘men of learning’ and time segments horizontally from 
BC650 to AD50. 
 
 
Source: Joseph Priestley. 1765. A Chart of Biography. London: Johnson 
 
b) One of Playfair’s many graphs of economic relations: plotting the trade 
between England and Denmark plus Norway vertically and the time period 1700 
to 1780 horizontally to show how the ‘balance’ switched to be favourable to either 
side. 
 
Source: William Playfair. 1786. The Commercial and Political Atlas. 3rd ed. edition 1801 
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In contrast to Priestley’s display, we have the set of diagrams created by William 
Playfair (engineer, political economist and possible secret agent), credited as the 
inventor of statistical graphs in the early nineteenth century for developing 
genuine 2-D statistical graphs in political economy using data on trade, prices, 
and so forth.  With both axes informative, and with time on the horizontal axis, 
we see how diagrammatic representations use both dimensions of the 2D space 
in ways that both reveal states of affairs and offer possibilities of reasoned 
inference.  Figure 3b is one good example from Playfair’s work, showing two 
simple lines which not only reveal visually the path of two different elements 
(which might indeed have been gained from a table) but also reveal - without any 
tedious comparison (let alone addition or subtraction on the part of a table-
reader) - the ‘balance in trade ‘between the UK and two Nordic countries.  In 
this period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such a balance 
of trade was a critical question, both in terms of evidence and for theorizing by 
the political economists of the day, as well as extremely salient in the public 
domain.   
 
Other kinds of examples offer the same revealing and inferential resources.  
One such is the set of diagrams produced by August Crome in the early 
nineteenth century to depict the relative strength of states in ways which 
replaced both words and numbers.  These diagrams (examples are shown and 
discussed by Nikolow, 2001) have features of both tables and maps, but are 
neither: they use relatively-sized rectangular spaces and circles in the 2D space 
to provide a visual comparison of the relative resources of the different European 
states in order to reveal their relative political and economic power.  Other 
graphs depend neither on time nor space in their use of graphs, but on other 
features of phenomena that can be ordered along two dimensions.  Woody (2014) 
for example discusses graphic representations in chemistry of the periodic law, 
ordering atomic weight versus atomic volume on the two axes. 
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2.2 Indicating and Revealing  
I want to pick up two points from these first examples of inducing visibility.  
First, the line between indicating and revealing in creating diagrams is thin 
indeed.  They cannot really be separated, for the scientist in choosing how to 
represent things in a diagram both indicates and reveals hidden or non-obvious 
information in the relative position, variations, and sizes of the lines in a graph 
or shapes in a diagram.  Second, these indicating and revealing roles depend not 
only on the use of both dimensions of the 2D space in depicting those things, but 
also on the metrics used in the representations; care with both are needed to 
indicate patterns, relatives and relationships.  The spatial aspect is naturally 
important - both dimensions are important otherwise there would be no payoff 
from working with the resources of 2D and in employing visual reasoning and 
judgement.8 The metric aspect itself has two elements: one is the choice of 
metrics in scaling; and the second is the topological aspect.  Diagrams of 
empirical materials depend on both aspects, and thereby, of course, on the skills, 
knowledge and choices of the scientists in developing such metrics for their 
subject matter in order to make their diagrams a revealing technology and a 
useful or usable tool.   Diagrams don’t draw themselves (even with big data, 
machine learning, and automated computer programmes: someone has written 
the initial code and filled in the parameters).  And nor do diagrams use 
themselves.  Rather, diagrams are made and shared within a community of 
scientific users, usually with highly specialised diagrams particular to usage in 
that community.  Despite this, there are generic points to be made.   
 
Marcel Boumans (2016) recently argued for the importance of visual judgements, 
or rather the eye as an expert, in the ways that scientists frame statistical 
numbers and fashion them into lines in diagrams.  Almost never in the social 
                                                 
8 From this point of view, the schematic diagrams which join up labelled boxes with arrows found 
in parts of biology and the social sciences to depict causal relations, mechanisms, and pathways, 
do not make full use of the dimensionality potentialities of the 2D space.  Because they do not 
make full use of any metrics nor subject structure in form-content, they ‘float’ on the paper, 
limiting reasoning possibilities, as will emerge later in this paper.   
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science fields that concern Boumans are raw data presented directly in 
diagrams.  He gives a detailed account of the processes of treatment and 
manipulation that result in the time-graphs that were constructed by their 
innovator, Warren Persons, from business-cycle data and regularly used by 
economists and market commentators in the 1920s (see Figure 49).  The lines 
are the result of elaborate processes of composing together separate time-series 
data on different financial and economic phenomena into composite indicators of 
the business cycle.  That composition process depends on rules that are 
mechanical and ingenious as well as on visual judgements.  The individual 
numbers - the ‘items’ that make up the statistical data series - are already firmly 
ordered in time.  They cannot be taken out of time order, but they may have 
particular time-based variations (eg seasonal variations) removed from them.  
And each series can be related to others in the same space - but not necessarily 
exactly for the same calendar time as measured along the horizontal axis - for 
some series ‘lead’ the cycle and others ‘lag’ behind.  The lines joining up the 
treated numbers were represented in accordance with the (by then) established 
conventions of graphic work on this topic, with time on the horizontal axis and 
scaled vertically to be above or below a ‘trend’ line of the economy over time.  No 
longer raw numbers, interwar economists took these lines to represent the 
business cycle: for, as the OED definition suggests, these several associated lines 
of marks “represent symbolically the course of results of any [...] process”.   
  
                                                 
9 This particular example is from one of Persons’ collaborators, W.L. Crum. 
14 
 
Figure 4 Revealing Data Patterns:  Composing the mess of individual economic 
indicator series into a graph to uncover business cycles in the first ‘business 
barometer’. 
 
 
Source: Crum, W. 1925. The Interpretation of the Index of General Business Conditions. Chart 
14, p222. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 7, 217-235. 
 
Whereas Boumans is interested in how visual judgements are used to create 
those lines in a reliable way, that is, in the processes of turning raw observations 
into organised and meaningful lines on the graph; I am more interested here in 
the revealing aspects of the resulting diagrams, and so the sense that those 
scientists gained of the phenomena of interest they were aiming to represent.  
That is, the eye used not as a measuring judge, but as an instrument of 
perception and inference: of sense-making, and pattern recognition.  The 
business cycle was an ill-defined phenomenon in this period, and visual 
representations of this type were the result of following community views both 
about what it did not involve (not seasonal variation, not long-term trends), and 
what it did involve: a number of economic aspects that interacted or interrelated, 
but were not clearly described by any agreed causal mechanism or neat theory.  
The lines of marks in the diagrams revealed by Persons’ complex treatments 
(such as in Figure 4), suggest both the regularity and irregularity of the 
processes of economic activity, and their heterogeneous elements.  Their spatial 
form - in sets of curves moving together and apart over time, with different non 
regular and complex variations - offers the most succinct form of how economists 
described and understood the empirics of business cycle phenomenon in the early 
twentieth century.   
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These lines in combination formed what was called a ‘business barometer’, an 
inference tool for the community to predict the timing of future changes in the 
economy.  Use of this diagram as such a diagnostic tool was based on the 
confidence it provided in mapping or tracking the past history of the economy 
according to those lines.  We can see clearly here the difficulty of treating the 
diagram as a revealing diagram separately from its inferential possibilities for it 
fulfils both functions at once.  As Boumans suggests, the whole process of 
creating and using the barometer is a work of “graph-based inductive reasoning”.  
 
Boumans also points to alternative (and sometimes complementary) forms of 
manipulation and assembly for such data lines that rely on topological 
manipulation,10 that is, on stretching or compressing the lines so as to keep the 
same topological relations (as in caricatures) rather than by composing or 
decomposing the data series according to its time-component elements.  For 
both approaches, the purpose is to reveal, and make inferential use of its 
components.   
 
We see the topological work in Figure 2c, an example which comes from Arthur 
Bowley’s work of the very early twentieth century.  Bowley (one of the pre-
eminent social statisticians of the period, renowned not just for the introduction 
of random sampling, but perhaps the first statistical textbook for social 
scientists) figured out means to transform two data series to induce visibility of 
their relationship by creating a diagram in which inference might be drawn 
between the relative variations (not absolute values) in these two factors.  This 
involved going further than charting the table of numbers for the marriage rate 
and trade (from Figure 2a to Figure 2b).  In Figure 2c, he transformed the 
data, and reconstructed the chart to depict the two series on a base line 
representing the average value in both series, and adjusted the scales on the two 
sides to show the closest match for their variations (particularly the positive co-
                                                 
10 Topological manipulation, and its cognitive aspects, are explored for cases in mathematics in 
Giardino (2018). 
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movements in the later part of the graph).  Following this topological treatment, 
the new diagram reveals co-variations that were hardly visible in Figure 2b.  
While Bowley’s method can be interpreted as a graphic method of correlation 
(based on the technical manipulations and representation made), the outcome is 
not a single number but rather a spatially depicted relationship on the diagram 
which shows far more information about that relationship than the equivalent 
single statistical correlation coefficient would do (see Morgan, 1997).  Even 
though that correlation coefficient makes use of all the same data and so 
contains all the same amount of ‘information’ as the diagram, the latter offers a 
more revealing technology by making full and effective use of the dimensions of 
the 2D space.   
 
 
3.  Spaces and Dimensions of Reasoning  
The possibilities of reasoning with and from these kinds of diagrams raises the 
question that Larkin and Simon (1987) address in asking when reasoning with a 
diagram is better than reasoning with 10k words.  They argued that a 
diagrammatic form of representation is better (more “efficient” in a cognitive 
science formulation) for solving problems than a sentential representation when 
- I infer from their overall treatment - a) the material at issue can be spatially 
depicted and involves items that relate easily in a diagram but are difficult to 
relate easily and efficiently in sentential languages; and b) when the reasoning 
involved with the relations does not work easily in sentential form.  It is 
significant for this paper to note that for them “a representation consists of both 
data structures and programs operating on them to make new inferences” (p65), 
that is, it is not just the diagram’s form, but the operations that can be used on 
it, that matter for answering questions with a diagram.  Like Boumans they 
privilege the eye - but for them, the relevant property of the eye lies in enabling 
perceptual judgement about relationships rather than in judging smoothness 
and shapes of phenomena from numbers (the focus of Boumans’ discussion).  
Their point is that “efficiency” in “search, recognition and inference” depends on 
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a combination of the eye and the diagram, to obtain “perceptual results” at 
almost “zero cost” (p92). Their argument is buttressed by a thorough analysis 
using their two main examples of pulley systems and geometric proofs, which 
involved translating those diagrammatic depictions and associated reasoning 
tasks into equivalent sentential modes of representation and problem-solving.  
 
Larkin and Simon distinguish, with their examples, between diagrams that 
“describe systems in real ... or ideal” spaces, and graphic diagrams which they 
label “artificial diagrams” ie ones which “do not describe any actual spatial 
relationship” (Larkin and Simon, p 93).   I suggest it is better to label the latter, 
not “artificial diagrams”, but ‘diagrams in artificial space’.  Let me explain: from 
Larkin and Simon’s viewpoint, a map is a diagram of a real spatial system, a 
pulley can inhabit real space - so both can be described in a diagram in a 
similarly spatial world; that is, these diagrams map spatial dimensions of the 
object onto spatial dimensions in the diagram.  A geometric diagram inhabits an 
ideal spatial world, the abstract ideal world of mathematics.  In contrast, many 
diagrams drawn by scientists do not depict materials that exist in any real 
spatial system, but rather these scientists create artificial spaces, where the 
shapes and relations of their subject matters - that are not literally spatial - can 
be represented spatially into a 2D format.  Thus the messy graphs of statistics 
of the business cycle, or the circles and boxes of comparative power of European 
states, are each drawn into an artificial space constructed on paper to represent 
something in the world which is not inherently a spatial system.  The space of 
the human and social scientific diagrams of Figures 2 to 4 involve artificial 
spaces in which the numbers coming from a complex human and social system 
are used to depict lines or areas.  The axes provide the grounding for the 
relative positions of the lines and shapes; and by making such decisions about 
how to depict their materials, the scientist creates, describes and limits an 
artificial space which enables inferential or deductive reasoning about the 
objects depicted within that artificial space.  I stress that there is no one kind of 
artificial space.  Each kind of artificial space is constructed by a scientist or 
18 
 
their community when they choose to depict their subject matter in 
diagrammatic form.11   
 
The critical point I take from Larkin and Simon is their conclusion that such 
diagrams in artificial spaces are as equally open to ‘perceptual’ enquiry as those 
in real and ideal spaces.  Diagrams in artificial spaces can prompt recognition, 
and perceptual judgements, that enable the scientist to answer questions about 
their materials that it would be almost impossible to answer, and more 
important - perhaps not even arise - in other forms of representation.  And, 
when diagrams can make use of 2D space to depict relations, it may also be that 
those diagrams can be used to solve problems framed in that space more 
effectively than in using a large number of words (Larkin and Simon’s claim), or 
more than a long list of numbers in a table.   
   
But such diagrammatic enquiry is only possible, and hence potentially 
productive, when the visual form in which the scientific subject matters are 
represented gives them, and can make use of, spatial properties.  For example, 
Priestley’s diagram (Figure 3a) does not activate such perceptions or productive 
inferences because - as I pointed out - it does not make full use of the spatial 
properties of the vertical dimension.  The important contrast seen in the 
diagrams of Figure 2b/c, 3b and 4 is that they make use of both dimensions of 
the space: having productive vertical axes means the diagrams can reveal the 
variations in each line, the relative movements of the different lines, and the 
relative lack of smooth behaviour.  None of these can easily be captured in 
words or sufficient statistical measures, showing how a diagram in artificial 
space can be a better format of representation for interrogating those traces of 
evidence.  As is evident from the contrast between 3a and 3b, the artificial 
space of a diagram needs to be structured in some way to enable the diagram to 
                                                 
11 For example, Perini (2013) examines the kinds of diagrams and schema that biologists 
habitually use and classifies them according to their content and form; Sheredos et al (2013) offer 
another analysis of biological diagrams according to their functions.  Some of these diagrams use 
artificial space, and others real, though this characteristic is not part of their analysis. 
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be grounded for use in that space.  And as is evident from the comparison 2b 
and 2c, there are various ways to do that. 
 
As we have already seen, the most obvious way in which 2D space is structured 
is by some form of axes, whether scaled or merely ordinal.  At first sight, this 
does not seem to be very flexible and, neither do the modes of reading that space, 
for Krämer points out that the basic ways in 2D space can be read: up and down, 
right and left, and centre and periphery are not “interchangeable” (Kramer, 
2016, p210).  But even so, there is considerable flexibility in what can be 
depicted - both in terms of the myriad number of things that can be put into the 
diagram, and in the different content forms of depiction.   
 
To start with, the two dimensions of 2D space do not constrain the scientist to 
depict only two aspects of their materials.  Minard’s famous 1869 graph of 
Napoleon’s Russian campaign, much lauded in Edward Tufte (1983) is a mixed-
space diagram.  It is partly one of real space (because of its qualities as a map in 
which distances provide the basic metrics for the graph) and partly uses artificial 
space in depicting the size of the army (as depicted by the width of lines on the 
graph) and temperature (depicted at key points in the campaign in a time-series 
graph below the distance graph/map).12   All this information could have been 
given, and surely has been, in verbal formats, but the succinct form of putting all 
these separate bits of evidence together has tremendous revealing power.  The 
main point is not that you could not make the arguments or reveal the 
components in another form: historians have undeniably done so in sentential 
form in this case - but that, applying Larkin and Simon’s main point here: the 
diagrammatic form is much more efficient for revealing the problems that beset 
the campaign, and for making inferences about the factors that lead to 
                                                 
12 We might be tempted to suppose that temperature is depicted in a real space diagram, but we 
are really referring to the indicator on the measuring instrument for temperature, ie to 
conventional numbers on the thermometer. Just having numbers as a good measure of 
empirically accessible things (size of army, temperature) does not mean that the phenomena to 
which they refer are spatial phenomena and so are diagrammed in real 2D space. 
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Napoleon’s defeat.  Tufte argued that “it may well be the best statistical graphic 
ever drawn” ((1983, p40).   
 
Minard’s diagram helps us to recognise that the 2-dimensionality of a 
representational space (constrained by the surface on which a diagram is drawn) 
is not necessarily a constraint that means a scientist can only recognise or 
reason about the relation or parallels between two different things, either in the 
empirical domains (discussed above) or in the abstract or theoretical domains (to 
be discussed later).  We have already seen in the statistical graphical diagram of 
Figure 4 using artificial space, that a flat 2D artificial space can be used to 
depict many items when all are ordered in time (and even at different time 
delays), and they can show associated series and possible relationships between 
many more than two factors, just as the pulley system depicted in real space can 
have many elements.  Time and mechanical connections offer two kinds of 
orderings or relations found in many different subject matters using real or 
artificial space that can be depicted onto a 2D surface.   
 
In practice, the spatially structured possibilities of 2D space are actually very 
flexible, not just for the depiction of many things, but for depicting many 
different characteristics of something, and for depicting many different kinds of 
relations or properties of those things.  In one, possibly extreme, example: 
architects’ diagrams are concerned with depicting the physical aspects of things 
in three dimensions onto 2D space, and do so in relation to human scales, so 
architects’ design diagrams can be considered mainly diagrams of real space.  
But they can also show many additional elements: using shape, size, position, 
and direction to depict not only walls, rooms, etc, but also indicate human 
experiences of sound, light, heat, wind and rain patterns, as well as human 
concerns such as privacy (see Do and Gross, 2001).  An equally fruitful example 
comes with diagrams of crystals.  Elkins (1999, Chapter 2) dissects the many 
different ways in which crystal diagrams use the full possibilities of 2D real 
space to reveal different 3D properties by using different conventions of 
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representation.  His historical survey runs from drawings of actual crystals in 
the early eighteenth century, through depictions of how crystals fit together 
(including diagrams of crystals’ ‘habits’), and in parallel and stereographic 
projections.  Some of these representations are drawings, some are diagrams of 
idealized forms, and each form of diagram offers different insights into the 
properties of crystals.   
 
These are just two specialist field examples, but the possibilities are 
considerable, and now extended with computer graphic methods.  Elkins, in his 
(Chapter 13) discussion of schemata (the category that is closest to diagrams 
here) refers to the use of axes, scales, lines, nets, grids, rulers and lattices, on 
which can be drawn circles, trees, columns, bars, and nets as well as lines and 
points.  The social sciences produce decision trees, network diagrams, flow 
diagrams, causal chains, etc, all of which are fitted into, and grounded in, 2D 
artificial spaces.  Figure 5 depicts two examples of such diagrams to indicate a 
little of the vast variety.  Figure 5a depicts a group structure of a ‘street corner’ 
gang from William Foote Whyte’s analysis of a North Boston slum in the 1930s.  
Formal axes are absent, but the social hierarchy is completely obvious in this 2D 
artificial space.  Figure 5b provides a diagram from a parallel study of social 
groups in a Southern black/white town in the same period.  It maps individuals 
in the black community into their social groups.  The grouping uses age 
(horizontally, like time) and class ranging from “LL” (lower lower class) to “U” 
upper class, (vertically expressed by convention) to depict the membership 
characteristics of different special interest groups or ‘cliques’.    
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Figure 5 Group and Caste Maps: Using the 2D to depict social relationships 
 
a)Whyte’s map of the relationships of individuals in a ‘street corner’ gang in 
Boston in the late 1930s. 
 
 
Source: William Foote Whyte. 1943. Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian 
Slum. From Chapter 1, p13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
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b) Davis, Gardner and Gardner’s map of the social stratification amongst the 
African American community in Mississippi in the early 1930s, arrayed by age 
horizontally and by class (Upper down to Lower Lower class) vertically. 
 
 
Source: Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner and Mary R. Gardner (1941) Deep South: A Social 
Anthropology of Caste and Class.  Figure 13.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
At this point I return to my main argument to make the next step.  Diagrams in 
artificial space do not depict spatial relations between objects in the world, such 
diagrams use artificial space to depict and reveal other kinds of relations.  So 
long as these presented relations in the diagrams are constructed to use the 
properties of 2-D space, they can potentially fulfil Larkin and Simon’s argument 
that they provide for efficient problem solving.   But such problem solving using 
the resources of such diagrams in artificial space does not necessarily lead to 
inference beyond the diagram to the real objects and relations depicted in those 
diagrams.   
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Making inferences with diagrams depends on subject matter knowledge of course 
(it always does).  Much of the time, scientists make inference within the diagram 
about the relations between the objects depicted in the diagram: that is about 
what is being revealed, in patterns, in co-movements, etc. and about what can be 
argued for given the reasoning using the diagram.  More problematic is any 
inference made from the results of either empirical or theoretical reasoning made 
in using the diagram back to the world, that is, to the system, objects, and 
relations depicted in the diagram.13 This is a big topic, but it seems reasonable 
to suggest that while some inferences from diagrams using real space might be 
feasible, it is likely more problematic for diagrams using artificial space.  
Downes (2012) argues (for diagrams generally) that inference from diagrams is 
more difficult than from images such as photographs of various kinds, because 
the latter offer ‘direct representations’ which depict (and in some way look like) 
the object that they represent.  Diagrams don’t represent in this ‘direct’ way, 
rather they are “inferentially distant from their objects” (Downes quoting 
Roskies, 2012, p 123).  On the other hand, inferences from diagrams might be 
more ‘legible’ than those from images such as photographs, because lots of 
(arguably unimportant) details are omitted in the diagram.  This certainly 
seems to be relevant to inference within the diagram. However, this benefit does 
not extend to inference back to the world in any immediate sense.  Diagrams 
can clarify the hypotheses about what happens in the world either empirically or 
theoretically but these hypotheses from diagrammatic reasoning may have to be 
carefully examined with other methods of science in order to make valid back-to-
the-world inference, particularly when the space of the diagram is artificial.14    
                                                 
13 Of course, such ‘back inference’ is in any case problematic for all sorts of scientific research not 
just that using diagrams - very obviously with model work and case work, but even for 
experimental work, where the strict controls in the lab may make inference beyond the lab 
difficult.  There is a large literature, part surveyed as the problem of ‘resituating knowledge’ in 
Morgan (2014a). 
14 Diagrams in mathematics might be different, for here inference within the diagram does not 
need to be inferred back to the world, but rather remains argument and proof within the 
diagram: now understood as deductive rather than inductive proof.  Of course, diagrammatic 
work in mathematics may support broader theoretical work at a more generic level, as perhaps in 
knot diagrams in which case inference or deduction can be within and beyond the diagram to 
speak to more general mathematical claims (see De Toffoli and Giardino, 2014).  But those 
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4.  Visualizing and Visual Deduction 
While many sciences have relied on the inductive use of diagrams using 
empirical resources, scientists have also developed their own forms of diagrams 
to encourage visual deduction.  These practices of visualizing involve the 
construction of diagrams to represent the imagined relations or hypothesized 
objects and phenomena of their sciences at a theoretical level.  They are 
widespread in the sciences, many using artificial not ideal spaces, and usually 
highly specialised to a community of scientists.  Usage of such diagrams 
involves not so much recognition in empirical materials of shapes, movements, 
changes and so forth over time but rather envisioning in diagrammatic form the 
properties, behaviour, causes and associations that are involved in abstract, 
conceptual or theoretical materials in order to reason about those materials.  In 
the context of a study of the history of graphs, Judy Klein has labelled the kind 
of arguments made with these theory-concept diagrams as reasoning about 
“logical time law curves” (versus the analysis of “historical time fact curves” of 
the type discussed earlier in this paper).15  She refers here to the reasoning 
about the possible things that can happen in these scientifically imagined 
worlds, where these ‘logical’ changes are determined by the scientists’ theories 
about the phenomena as represented in the diagram.  Reasoning with these 
theoretical-based diagrams enables scientists to explore the content of their 
theories, suggest new hypotheses or close off others, and so forth.  
 
The classic example of these theory-based curves in economics are the supply 
and demand diagrams that Alfred Marshall drew in the 1890s shown in Figure 
6.  The creation of such diagrams first of all involves imagination about the way 
                                                 
direct mathematical deductions are surely different than using knot diagrams to model idealized 
DNA diagrams, in which case inference from the ideal space mathematical diagram to the 
artificial space source field diagram of DNA is a ‘back inference’ problem that requires other 
support (see Priest et al, 2018).    
15 In fact, Klein (1995) offers a four way analysis of diagrams, drawing on many historical 
examples in science going back to Nicholas Oresme, but the main force of her argument is based 
on eighteenth and early nineteenth-century examples including the seminal forms developed and 
used by Johann Lambert, James Watt and William Playfair.   
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the world is, and how it works, to depict the range of possibilities in the different 
shapes of the curves (see Morgan 2012, and 2014).  Their subsequent usage 
involves a different cognitive practice from either perception or making eyeball 
judgements, but one that appeals to visualizing skills to make deductions 
visually from working with the diagrams. 
 
Figure 6 - Marshall’s Visual Deduction with Diagrams in Supply and Demand 
Theorizing 
 
 
Source: Alfred Marshall. 1890. Principles of Economics.  London: Macmillan.  Book V, Chapter 
XIII, Figures 24-6, Note 1, p. 464; Figures 27-9, Note 1, p. 466.  Reproduced with 
acknowledgement to Marshall Library of Economics. 
 
Interestingly, Larkin and Simon use these very same Marshall diagrams as 
examples of their “artificial diagrams”, although as I suggested above, it makes 
more sense to refer to these as ‘diagrams in artificial space’.  Using imagination 
to give form to such theoretical ideas in 2D artificial space requires adopting 
some metric, or device, in which to pin down the diagrammatic structures within 
that artificial space.  Real space diagrams such as geographical maps are 
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pinned down by the 2 and 3 dimensions of the real space depicted in the 
representation: the north/south/east/west dimensions, and the topographical 
height lines. Geological maps use 2D real space to chart layers of different strata 
beneath the surface that lie over each other.  In contrast, and at first sight, 
these late nineteenth-century diagrams from Marshall appear to be 
unconstrained by any feature that pins the diagrammed objects into the artificial 
space they inhabit; there are no obvious metrics or topology compared to those 
found in the earlier examples of statistical graphs. But just because a space is 
artificial does not mean that its space is arbitrarily defined; rather the space of 
such a diagram is defined or pinned down by the concepts, definitions, and 
theories of the subject matter of the science.   
 
In terms of depiction, the curves in Marshall’s diagrams, represents how 
economists hypothesize that consumers and producers imagine they might 
behave, with quantities on the horizontal axis and prices on the vertical (see 
Morgan 2014).  The market-level SS supply curves depict how economists 
hypothesize producers (as a group) might respond in changing their supply as 
prices rise and the market-level DD demand curves depict how consumers (as a 
group) might respond as prices change.  The supply and demand curves depicted 
therefore occupy an artificial space defined by the relations of prices and 
quantities, both envisaged on an ordinal scale on the axes - the diagram enables 
the theorized behaviour of consumers and producers to be depicted together.  
These abstract, concept-based, diagrams developed out of earlier descriptions of 
the ‘laws of supply and demand’ which were verbally couched using arithmetical 
terms describing consumers and producers responding to higher or lower, rising 
or falling, prices.   
 
Using such diagrams requires a degree of imagination along with a facility for 
deductive reasoning to explore the hypothesized relations using the 
diagrammatic resources.  For economists, this exploratory-explanatory 
reasoning uses the theories of supply and demand behaviour to explore various 
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possible reasons (or hypotheses) for changes in the curves, tracing through the 
steps of the argument to an outcome using the diagrams of Figure 6.  (For 
example, these could include a change in income that changes the DD curve’s 
position, or a change in technology that shifts the SS curve.)  Marshall himself 
asked four questions with each version of the diagram: what would happen if the 
demand curve shifts up or down (ie changes the quantity demanded for all 
prices); what would happen if the supply curve shifts up; and what happens if 
there is a tax on the good (so as to increase the price)?   I have described these 
processes of usage elsewhere as ‘model experiments’, experiments that involve 
deductive reasoning by manipulating the diagrammatic model.16  Some of these 
deductive visual experiments were done by Marshall physically drawing the shift 
in the curves in the 2D space of the diagram; others were done as mental spatial 
deductions, only possible because the answer had become obvious from the 
previous visual diagrammatic reasonings.   Priest (2018), in writing about 
Darwin’s invitation to readers to imagine different scales on his ‘tree of life- 
diagram, refers to the such mental visual reasoning as “manipulative 
imagination”, an apt label for a practice once a diagram has become well 
accepted and used in a community.17  Giardino (2018) uses that term in 
discussing experts’ reasoning with knot diagrams in mathematics; and she also 
introduces the term “representational affordances” to provide a sense of the 
enabling possibilities of diagrams.  Diagrams prompt the manipulative 
imagination, but at the same time they anchor and constrain the manipulations 
that are possible.  The visual deductive reasonings with the diagrams of Figure 
6 gave Marshall a testing ground for his theories in figuring out what kinds of 
                                                 
16 See Morgan, 2012, Chapter 7, and before that, Morgan, 2002 on model experiments.  I would 
not want to call the exploratory work done in these kinds of experiments on diagrams 
representing theoretical claims as counterfactual since these are not ‘fact-based’ diagrams. There 
are fact-based experiments done on empirical diagrams in economics, some of which might count 
as counterfactual, but are more usually referred to as  ‘scenarios’ or ‘simulations’. 
17 One might have used the term ‘thought experiment’ here, but ‘manipulative imagination’ 
works better because the diagram both constrains and anchors the reasoning, and so the 
manipulations that are possible. 
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things might happen in an hypothesised world whose relationships and 
behaviours were pictured in the artificial space diagram and tracked in its usage.   
 
The manipulative possibilities, both on the diagram using the diagram, and 
mentally in thinking with the diagram, are key to the claim of deductive 
reasoning.  Such reasonings may also involve mathematical operations.  Once 
again it is worth emphasising that this is not a particularly social science mode, 
but rather a generic mode of using diagrams within the sciences wherever the 
diagram affords the use of mathematics at certain points.  For economists with 
their diagrams, it was a simple step to indicate optimum points by depicting 
tangencies to curves: thus bringing mathematical reasoning into the argument, 
where it was efficient to do so.   Chao (2018) discusses how geographers 
(between the 1820s and 1930s) created and understood their location theories 
directly in terms of ideal geometric shapes: concentric rings, triangles, and 
hexagons; and then reasoned about the properties of location in terms of such 
ideal mathematical spaces.  He points out how later economists reversed the 
process to argue from their mathematized theories into spatial interpretations in 
diagrammatic form.    Wise (2017) discusses how visual simulations of the 
processes of chemical bonding rely on diagrams based on mathematical models to 
explore the multiple paths to such bonding using computer simulations.  Priest, 
et. al. (2018) discuss how the DNA double helix diagram was first reasoned with 
by depicting its 3D qualities in a 2D space using linking struts and up and down 
arrows.  As they tell it, knot diagrammatic methods of manipulation were 
subsequently applied to the DNA double helix diagram, but only following some 
discussion with the mathematicians as to whether the subject content of the 
DNA diagrams allowed for such mathematical treatment.   
 
Diagrams - as other forms of representation - both ‘constrain’ and ‘afford’.  
Reasoning with diagrams, both physically and mentally, offers a demonstration 
system for exploring theoretical possibilities about the phenomena, not an 
illustration system of what is known about the world.  Such deductive inference 
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is a process of using the diagram to learn about what the diagram can and 
cannot teach the scientist about the nature of the imagined world, not a 
visualization that could easily validate direct or indirect inferences to the real 
world that is being depicted.  Provided that the diagrammatic materials are 
pinned down into 2D space and structured in some way to depict and so 
constrain their relations in ways that are consistent with the subject matter, 
then Larkin and Simon’s claim about reasoning and problem solving with diverse 
kind of diagrams in artificial space work in much the same way as for the real 
and ideal forms of diagrams they analysed.  What is perhaps less evident is that 
each space - ideal, real or artificial - potentially has its own language and 
grammar used by the scientist in working with their diagrams.   
 
 
5.  Modes of Diagrammatic Reasoning 
Reasoning with diagrams - visual deductions - relies on both the content of the 
diagram and its rules of manipulation or operation, both of which are determined 
in large part by the subject matter and how these are imagined and visualised.  
The meanings and rules of behaviour of the subject matter supply the vocabulary 
and grammar of the diagrams.18 For example, the vocabulary of kinship 
diagrams shows the possible array of relationship connections, but analysis 
based on many anthropological studies of different cultures suggests that there 
is more than one system - or grammar - of kin relations that can be depicted in 
kinship diagrams: there are two types (and perhaps an extra half, see Read, 
2013).  The typical European kinship pattern depicts horizontal and vertical 
relations, is ‘read’ downwards (usually) by generation, and allows, for example, 
                                                 
18 Taking a cue from Do and Gross (2001), I use the terms ‘grammar and vocabulary’, rather than 
‘syntax and semantics’, to apply to my discussion of diagrams.  We are used to the idea that 
there are separate rules and practices of both grammar and vocabulary, and it is well-understood 
these gradually change over time and vary over languages and cultures.  Shimojima (2001) 
discusses 7 different versions of the graphic/linguistic pairings, included Goodman’s (1976) 
account of syntax, itself subject to an interesting critique from Elkins (1999) in his account of 
visual images.  Woody (2000) discusses the units of molecular orbital diagrams as members of an 
‘alphabet’. 
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for several marriages, with children by each marriage.  But there is another 
typical kinship pattern found in other societies, which can best be diagrammed 
with diagonal lines in which the children of one’s siblings count as one’s own.  
Here the grammar of kinship relations provide the rules of construction and use 
of the diagram.  In general, the grammar is not only important to the depiction, 
but outlines the allowable manipulation or operations that can be conducted in 
reasoning with the diagram (and so provides the ‘logic’ that Klein (1995) points 
to).  
 
The subject matter of a diagram, as it is developed and used by the community of 
scientists, feeds constraints and determines possibilities into the operations and 
vice versa.  Once created, the grammar and vocabulary of a diagram do not just 
depict allowable relations and moves, but also determine some that are not 
possible.  So it is not just the diagram, but their grammars and vocabularies 
which are developed within a community of use; and these may not always be 
clearly articulated before they become conventional and unspoken.  Thus, these 
rules of operation and vocabulary are as obvious to those in the community of 
users in the case of the real space diagram of the pulleys as in they are the 
artificial space of Marshall’s diagrams.  In reasoning with the mechanical pulley 
system diagram, it is the kind of standard parts, and structure of the typical 
interrelations of the parts, which enable the user of the diagram to figure out 
what can happen.  This involves using the rules of how pulleys work and how 
the system works to answer questions and solve potential problems about pulley 
systems by reasoning with the diagram.  The rules of how to use the real pulley 
system are different from the rules of reasoning in the ideal space of a geometric 
proof; and both are different from the rules of reasoning based upon the 
grammar and vocabulary of diagrams in artificial space such as Marshall’s 
diagrams.  The user of any diagram needs to understand both the grammar and 
the vocabulary of that system and these will differ between systems.  The 
difference depends not in the nature of the space, but in the subject matters 
depicted and used in reasoning with the diagram.  
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For the business cycle graphs, the grammar may be more clearly defined than 
the vocabulary. Thus the rules for charting and using the lines on such diagrams 
must adhere to the rules for reading and using time-series graphs: time is 
represented on an axis orthogonal to the variables represented, time goes in one 
direction, and the lines are in a timed relation to each other (even if they do not 
all match in time, ie are leading or lagging one of the other lines).  What exactly 
these lines refer to, and so how to interpret them is less clear.  On the one hand, 
it is obvious, for they are data taken from various observatories of the economy 
and treated (as discussed above) to create the lines that reveal the patterns and 
relations between them.  But exactly what the broader inductive space involves 
is much less obvious, for the community of users interprets these diagrams as 
‘indicator’ diagrams and their interpretation in terms of business cycle ideas, 
definitions, concepts and theories remains opaque.   
 
In contrast, in the case of the diagrams of supply and demand, the vocabulary 
and it meanings are rather straightforward to the community as theoretical 
constructions not empirical ones. The curves have clear meaning to them, and it 
is clear also what the points on those curves and shifts in the curves represent in 
terms of the economists’ notions of ‘laws of supply and demand’.  The axes form 
ordinal scales for the two variables of prices and quantities.  It is important that 
the meanings of the curves have implications for the grammar, that is, for what 
are allowable shapes and allowable movements of those curves; not all shapes 
and not all movements are considered possible according to the subject matter 
represented in the diagram.  For example, serious discussions might involve 
questions as to whether the curves could hit the axes, whether they must be 
continuous or could be discontinuous, whether they could be wiggly or not, and 
so forth: issues about the grammar of the diagram.  But in the case of the 
Marshallian diagrams, as with many such theory-driven diagrams in economics, 
there are elements of the relations and so grammar of usage which are also 
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mathematical constructions (such as tangencies to curves) which mean the 
diagrams depend on a mixed grammar.19   
 
The issue here - previously hidden or neglected in worrying about what diagrams 
are - is the emphasis on the operations that are done on diagrams and how these 
are constituted, characterised, and restrained.  Of course, this is equally 
relevant to questions about the different operations on representations which are 
not diagrammatic.  This was the starting point for my investigation: namely 
how decisions about form of representation have implications for the form of 
reasoning used.  As argued in Larkin and Simon (following others, p 68), the 
differences between representations is not about the notations, but the 
operations used on them.  But the important point for me here is these are not 
independent.  Both have implications for the other, as Chao (2018) shows in his 
discussion of cases from the history of location theory in geography.  I turn to 
another example in economics to clarify this by looking at examples of different 
depictions of the same subject matter, using the same vocabulary, but where the 
diagrams are made in forms that embed conceptual differences between their 
objects, and require different operations because their use involves different 
grammars.  
 
Again in the late nineteenth century, three economists developed accounts of the 
relations that individual people (not groups in the market) had with the goods 
they sought to consume - the utility relation.  These founders of this conceptual 
and theoretical shift in what is called ‘value theory’ included, at significant 
points in their writings, diagrams to motivate their ideas as found in Figure 7 
(a, b & c, below).  In one of them, William Stanley Jevons (1871), depicted 
variations in the “intensity of feeling from moment to moment” (p30) as the 
‘duration’ of consumption increases.  This curve of feelings of pleasure and pain, 
                                                 
19 See Morgan 2012, chapter 2, for an historical account of how economists in developing the 
Edgeworth box diagram created the vocabulary and grammar of the diagram in ways that used 
both mathematical and subject matter forms and rules of reasoning. 
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as directly experienced by the consumer, was transposed into utility space (in 
Figure 7a), depicting the same kind of intensity (on the vertical axis) and 
quantity of utility (on the horizontal axis) to be gained from increasing 
consumption of a commodity (with the area under the curve depicting the whole 
quantity of utility).  The diagram was used to show the feelings of people based 
on their psychological response as they increased their amount consumed of the 
good, and to pinpoint the exact point to stop consuming - thus defining the 
marginal unit of the good.  Jevons described and depicted this human behaviour 
in the ‘ideal space’ of mathematics using the calculus to define changes in 
feelings, because for him, the mathematics of his diagram in ideal space mapped 
the ‘real space’ of man’s physiological and mental experience of utility from 
consumption.   
 
Figure 7 - Utility Diagrams: 2D diagrams designed to depict theories of utility in 
ways that enable reasoning. 
a) Jevons’s utility curve experienced by the individual: ‘intensity’ on the vertical 
axis, ‘duration’ on the horizontal. 
 
 
Source: William Stanley Jevons. 1871. Theory of Political Economy. 3rd Edition, 1888. Figure IV, 
p. 49. London: Macmillan & Co. 
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Another, Carl Menger (1871) produced the 2-D diagram in Figure 7b.  This is a 
particularly interesting example where the rules of usage - its grammar - is not 
at all self-evident.   It looks superficially like a mathematical matrix, but is not.  
It could be thought of as a 2-D table, but is not quite that either.  Its numbers 
depict not numerical amounts of utility, nor feelings of pleasure and pain from 
consumption of one good as Jevons’ diagram did, but expressed relative 
equivalent values in satisfying different needs with different goods.  The 
vertical and horizontal dimensions were designed to reflect the gradations of 
satisfactions of needs in life to be obtained both from consuming more of one good 
(vertically depicted) and equivalences of each good against a set of different 
goods (horizontally).   Both implied ‘axes’ use ordinal scales.  The point of the 
diagram is not just to depict the menu of possibilities that the consumer faces, 
but to use the diagram to make a number of reasoned points.  The flexibility of 
the diagram enabled Menger to depict not only consuming more or less units of 
the same good (eg, more or less food reasoning downwards), but that these can be 
interpreted as successive values associated with satisfying different needs by 
different usages of the same good (for example, satisfactions gained from Good I 
(water) could be, in descending order of satisfaction, water for drinking, for 
washing, for cooking, for watering the crops, or for one’s dog or horse, etc).   
More significantly, the diagram is used to demonstrate how equivalence 
judgements are made by suggesting how a consumer decides at a certain point to 
stop consuming more units of Good I (to use his example: food) and instead 
consume their first unit of Good V (tobacco) - namely where the satisfactions to 
be gained are equal at (ordinal) value 6.  These equivalences can be followed by 
reading the numbers, but are more effectively seen by visual perception because 
of the alignment of numbers along the diagonals in the 2D space of the diagram.  
To know how to use the diagram requires us to understand the grammar of the 
diagram before we can understand the abstract theses Menger is advancing, but 
before we can understand those abstract claims about his concept of utility, we 
need to know the nature of the relationship between the needs of man and the 
value of different needs satisfied by a good.  A succinct understanding of his 
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theory requires a sense of how all the goods, needs, and values fit together as in 
the relationships depicted in the diagram, and which then enable reasoning with 
those relationships. 
 
Figure 7 - Utility Diagrams: 2D diagrams designed to depict theories of utility in 
ways that enable reasoning. 
b) Menger’s utility schedule of satisfactions of needs as experienced by the 
individual: from goods arrayed horizontally, and each good satisfying different 
needs arrayed vertically. 
 
Source: Carl Menger. 1871. Principles of Economics. 1950 translated and edited by James 
Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz. p127. New York: The Free Press.  
 
In a third version, J.B. Clark (1899) created the 2-D diagram in Figure 7c 
depicting the set of different services (utilities), a commodity provides, A through 
F, with the highest value to the consumer coming from A and the lowest from F.  
He argued that the second unit of any commodity used for the same service (eg 
A) will have negative value (Aʹ), so each different good has a vertical line 
indicating the positive value of the first unit of the service and its second 
negative unit (a second overcoat over the first might have negative utility). The 
letters could also refer to a bundle of different services that consumer might 
value from the same one commodity.  In that case, the sloping line drawn from 
joining these letters up on the diagram depicts the diminishing amounts of value 
or utility coming from those different services provided from the same good. For 
example, imagine the good is a canoe (his example): A could be the service of 
keeping the person afloat (a service which is satisfied by a certain quality of a 
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piece of wood that floats); B could be the power to move across the water; down to 
F which could be the colour and fittings of the canoe.  For Clark, these services 
were associated with the valuations held by different social groups who would 
demand those services, for each social group sets or decides its own marginal 
value for each service, and so sets the price for those services.  It is all a bit 
more complicated than this, but it is clear already that the use of the 2D space, 
the means of representation, and the practices of reasoning are once again 
interdependent.  And they are very different here in Clark’s account from those 
of Menger and Jevons.   
 
Figure 7 - Utility Diagrams: 2D diagrams designed to depict theories of utility in 
ways that enable reasoning. 
c) Clark’s utility graph experienced by the individual as member of a social 
group: with different degrees of utility vertically, and bundles of different 
attributes of the good/service horizontally.  
 
 
Source: John Bates Clark. 1899. Distribution of Wealth. p232. New York: Macmillan.  
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These three different diagrams in Figure 7 are concept-forming visualizations 
created in conceiving the relations between people and their enjoyment of, or a 
need for, goods (the concept of utility) explored in diagrams of those relations in 
2D space, real or artificial (depending on the scientist involved).  Although they 
all share the notion that the ‘marginal unit’ is the important one in decision 
making, they do not share the same diagram, nor a mode of reasoning: the 
grammar for manipulating and using each diagram is different.  This is 
because, despite bearing the same labels, they do not share the same meanings 
of utility, the vocabulary has different conceptual connotations across the three.  
And they each rely in different ways on their diagrams and those spatial 
arrangements to define and develop their different abstract accounts using a 
number of elements in that 2D space.  What they also share is using a diagram 
not just to help define their notions of utility but at the same time to help them 
to investigate the relations inherent in their concepts.  The differences between 
the three diagrams - and how they can be reasoned with - are critical to an 
understanding of the difference between their theories. 
 
Again, lest this be considered an example that is peculiar to economics, consider 
the case of the history of the periodic law and table.  Woody (2014 and 
elsewhere) shows how there were many different depictions of the periodic law, 
some were diagrams, some were graphs with empirical reference, some were 
tables-cum graphs, some were ‘tables’ which, like Menger’s, did not fit any 
standard format.20 These objects that represented the periodic table or law were 
be reasoned with according the grammar and vocabulary of those 
representations, and their differences were critical to an understanding of the 
differences in theories about that phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
20 The amazing range of diagrams and other artefacts depicting the periodic law, in its 
theoretical and empirical counterparts, that appeared over the history of reasoning about the 
periodic law/table were presented in Andrea Woody’s talk at a Pittsburgh workshop on diagrams 
in 2015; only a small subset are given in Woody (2014).  Woody (2000) also provides a 
informative analysis of the construction, representation, and reasoning associated with different 
molecular orbital diagrams which parallels some of my analyses in this paper. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In considering the usage of diagrams in artificial spaces, such as the empirical 
ones of business cycle evidence and the theoretical experiments with supply and 
demand curves, there might be a presumption (as I suggested at the start) that 
the empirical graphs use one kind of logic for statistical thinking (induction), and 
the supply/demand diagrams use another associated with their mathematical 
equivalents in algebraic form (deduction).  Yet the final examples of utility 
thinking with diagrams suggests we need to be very cautious in assuming that 
any particular form of metrics (statistical or mathematical) provide all we need 
to know to determine the logic of reasoning appropriate for any diagram.  The 
subject matter of a diagram determines not just the vocabulary but the grammar 
of use which elucidates and determines the operations that can be made on it.  
Recognising that there will be such vocabularies and grammars enables us to 
understand scientists’ explorations with their diagrams and thus how those 
activities prove useful to their scientific community. 
 
To illustrate the main point more simply now that it has been made, we can 
usefully compare diagrams with a familiar subset of diagrams, namely maps.  
Diagrams come with keys, like map keys: vocabulary labels which are created 
along with the diagram (see Morgan, 2014 for the importance of this).  In 
economic diagrams, these keys could be labels of empirical materials - such as 
‘the monthly interest rate’ or they could be symbolic forms such as ‘r’ referring to 
the theoretical notion of ‘the interest return on capital’.  For maps, knowing the 
keys provides the vocabulary of the map, and enables a user to see what is 
where.  But to use any map to get around the world, users need to know the 
grammar of the map.  The grammar tells the user how the spatial arrangements 
on the piece of paper are related to the topology and relations depicted in the 
terrain.  Maps come in different forms, and whether the terrain is the flat A-Z 
one of London streets, or the topological one of the Rocky Mountains, or the 
hypothetical one of science fiction - each form will have its own grammar just as 
Figures 7a, b, and c do.  For maps, as for any diagram, the user needs to 
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understand not just how the 2D space of the particular diagram is organised but 
how the objects of the diagram relate, and it is this knowledge of the grammar 
that enables them to use the map for inference and for reasoning.  Similarly 
with a scientific diagram, understanding the grammar enables the user to infer 
from the diagram or to reason with the diagram about the things represented in 
the diagram, be they empirical or theoretical materials.   Maps are 
representations of real space, but the same arguments follow in the artificial 
spaces of diagrams constructed by scientists.  A community of scientists 
visualizing their materials into a diagram in a 2D artificial space must 
understand both the grammar and vocabulary of the diagram they have created 
to use it fruitfully in either the inductive or deductive mode.   
 
Whereas this investigation began with epistemic questions, it appears now that 
the answers have ontological import.  Decisions about diagrams involve 
decisions not just about what to depict, but how to depict it for use, both of which 
affect the way that the community thinks about the things depicted.  As they 
develop and use a diagram, those scientists come to understand those subject 
matters in different ways.  Diagrams may begin life to solve epistemological 
problems, but may have implications for the way those scientists think about 
their materials and subject matters, and so have ontological consequences.21  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This is a lesser claim than that of world-making that I advanced for the construction of models 
(2012), but by focussing on form and reasoning, it perhaps becomes a more subtle argument. 
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